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  Abstract 
 
This paper examines the effect that gender-based earnings discrimination has on self-employment dynamics 
among females, with a focus on four countries in Western Europe.  Using data from the European 
Community Household Panel in the 1999-2001 time period, we test the hypothesis that the probability of 
moving into self-employment is positively related to prior earnings discrimination, as measured by 
unexplained deviations from expected (male) earnings.  Our findings suggest that women who have lower 
than expected wage sector earnings relative to other women are more likely to leave wage employment in 
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  Gender Discrimination and Self-Employment Dynamics in Europe  
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
  Over the past several decades, identifying the determinants of self-employment 
and entrepreneurship behavior has been an important topic in the labor economics 
literature, both in the United States and abroad.  Researchers have sought to explain 
changes in self-employment rates over time, as well as differences in rates across 
demographic groups.  Part of the motivation for these studies has been the fact that 
governments have pursued the promotion of self-employment as a strategy for reducing 
unemployment or for increasing labor force activity among disadvantaged groups in 
particular, including youth, immigrants, ethnic minorities, and women.  It is therefore 
important to identify the factors that affect the choice between employment sectors.  It is 
especially important to determine whether self-employment is a desirable move "upward" 
for workers, or whether it is a second choice for those dissatisfied in the wage and salary 
sector.  One source of dissatisfaction could be wage or salary earnings less than 
“expected,” as compared with other workers.   
  In the present paper we examine this question for the case of women.   In 
particular, we focus on gender-based earnings discrimination as a source of the 
dissatisfaction that could lead women to choose self-employment.  Our hypothesis is that 
women who have earnings less than predicted according to male returns in one period 
will be more likely to choose self-employment in the following period. 
  We examine the hypothesis using data for four European nations, from the 




Our analysis yields mixed results, with a strong effect of deviations from expected female 
earnings, but less strong results for deviations from male earnings, depending on the 
model estimated. 
  The paper is organized as follows: section II presents a brief summary of recent 
papers focusing on the role of earnings in explaining sectoral choice.  Section III presents 
the rationale for the hypotheses studied, while section IV describes the methodology and 
data used in the study.  Results are presented in section V.  Conclusions and topics for 
further research are presented in section VI. 
 
II.  PREVIOUS WORK 
  Previous empirical analyses have identified several factors related to the self-
employment versus wage and salary employment decision, including the individual's 
preferences for income and risk, entrepreneurial ability, wealth, marginal tax rate, skill 
level, and various other personal characteristics.
1  Studies focusing on female self-
employment in particular also include variables related to marital status and the presence 
or ages of children, with child caring behavior studied as well.  These factors are related 
to the perceived greater degrees of autonomy and job flexibility in self-employment.
2   
  The most obvious factor related to the choice between self-employment and wage 
and salary work is the relative earnings expected in each of the respective sectors.  
Bernhardt (1994), using a sample of Canadian white males, finds that relative potential 
earnings is the dominant factor in determining the probability of employment in the self-
                                            
1 See Parker (2004) for a survey of the literature. 





3  This finding has been confirmed by many others, including Rees 
and Shah (1986) and Taylor (1996) for the UK, Clark and Drinkwater (2000) for England 
and Wales, Johansson (2000) for Finland, and recently Hammarstedt (2006) for Sweden.  
  The relative earnings (actual or predicted) between wage sector employment and 
self-employment is determined both by the wage earned in the wage sector and the 
earnings in the self-employment sector.  Gender based earnings discrimination in the 
wage sector can therefore impact the sectoral choice, depending on the existence and 
extent of customer discrimination in the self-employment sector (Borjas and Bronars, 
1989).  This relationship has been studied most explicitly by Leung (2006).
4  Using data 
from the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, he finds that the male/female 
log-earnings gap is larger in self-employment than in wage employment, but that the 
unexplained wage gap is larger in the wage sector.  His estimates suggest that gender 
based discrimination in the wage sector leads to an increase in the self-employment rate 
of women.  Hammarstedt (2006) arrives at a similar conclusion, but for immigrants, in 
Sweden.   
  Another paper related to the present analysis examines the effect that deviations 
from expected earnings in the wage sector have on the probability of self-employment 
among men (Andersson and Wadensjo, 2006).  They hypothesize that workers who are 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Williams (2003). 
3 One weakness of that analysis (and others like it) is its reliance on estimates of self-employment income, 
which can be suspect given the unallocated returns to capital as opposed to labor and the higher propensity 
of the self-employed to understate income.  The present paper does not suffer from this criticism, as its 
methodology does not require estimates of self-employment income. 
4 Another paper which studies explicitly the relationship between gender discrimination and the level of 
female self-employment, but using a very different approach, is Rosti and Chelli (2005).
 Other work related 
to discrimination and self-employment tends to focus on the effect that discrimination has on the incomes of 




“underpaid” (that is, have earnings less than expected compared with other men) in a 
given period will be more likely to make the transition to self-employment in the 
following period.  Using Swedish register data for the 1998-2002 period, they estimate 
probit equations for the probability of self-employment, including  dummy variables 
indicating whether the worker is underpaid or overpaid (“high achievers”) as independent 
variables, allowing for a non-linear effect.  Their results suggest that both groups 
(underpaid and overpaid) are more likely to make the transition to self-employment than 
the reference group.   
  This paper examines the effect of gender earnings discrimination using a method 
similar to that of Andersson and Wadensjo.  Our approach allows us to differentiate, 
however, between the variations in earnings resulting from discrimination and that 
resulting from under or overpayment as in their paper, thereby extending their analysis.  
One advantage to this approach, over that of Leung for example, is that we are not 
required to use self-employment earnings information, which can suffer from 
measurement error (see fn. 2 above). 
     
III.  WAGE DISCRIMINATION AND SECTOR CHOICE 
  Standard economic models suggest that the choice between self-employment and 
working in the wage and salary sector depends on several factors.
5  First is the expected 
gross return in self-employment, which might depend on the choice of occupation or 
industry of self-employment, coupled with perceived managerial and entrepreneurial 
                                            
5 Again, see Parker (2004) for examples of models of the choice of sector. Sectoral choice is closely related 




abilities of the worker.  Second are costs of capital and other inputs necessary for self-
employment. These factors are weighed against the expected wage that can be earned in 
wage and salary sector employment.  Finally, adjustments must be made for the 
preferences of the worker, such as the desire for autonomy, and the degree of risk 
aversion.  The worker is assumed to choose the sector that maximizes expected lifetime 
utility.  Transitions between the sectors arise over time as a result of receipt of new 
information represented by changes in any of the values of the variables noted above.  
The realization that one’s wage and salary earnings are not as high as expected, for 
example, may increase (ceteris paribus) the probability that an individual will move into 
self-employment from the wage and salary sector.  We hypothesize that gender based 
wage discrimination, which decreases the expected wage for women in the wage and 
salary sector, will lead to an increase in the rate of transition to self-employment among 
women.   
  It must be noted, however, that the above is true only to the extent that we can 
assume that gender based wage discrimination is not correlated with any gender 
discrimination in the self-employment sector.  In general the literature considers these to 
be based on employer and customer preferences, considered quite separate for this 
purpose, so we are confident in making this assumption. 
   To the extent our main hypothesis is true, one could argue that labor market 
discrimination leads to a suboptimal choice of sector.  Presuming that women who 
initially chose the wage and salary sector were maximizing their utility, then a subsequent 
move to self-employment as a result of discrimination must decrease it.   
                                                                                                                                                                                               





IV.  EMPERICAL METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
  Suppose the (log) wages of females and males in the wage and salary sector are 
determined by the following wage equations: 
      WiF= aF + bFXiF + eiF 
  and      WiM= aM + bMXiM + eiM 
where XF and XM are vectors of worker, firm, and industry characteristics for females and 
males, respectively, a is a constant term, b is a vector of regression coefficients, and “e” 
represents an individual-specific random error.  Then inserting the mean values of the Xs, 
the average log wages are given by 
      WF= aF + bFXF 
  and      WM= aM + bMXM, 
 
Let PWiF and PWiM represent the expected (predicted) log wages for an individual female 
i with a given set of values of characteristics, Xi, using the female and male wage 
equations, respectively: 
      PWiF = aF + bFXi 
      PWiM = aM + bMXi. 
That is, PWiF is the wage a female would expect to earn in the wage and salary market, 
given her characteristics Xi, and WiM is the wage the same female would expect to earn in 
the wage and salary market if she were treated as a male.  Let diF and diM be the 
deviations of a female's observed earnings (Wi) from the expected earnings (diF=Wi-




wage equation (= eiF).  This error is the focus of the analysis (for men) in Andersson and 
Wadensjo (2006). 
  The term diM is the difference between what the female worker earns and the 
predicted (average) earnings for a comparable male (as measured by the variables in X).  
This measure is similar to the measure of “discrimination” arising from the standard 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, except that it is calculated at an individual level.
6 
  Then variable diM can be written as: 
       diM = Wi - PWiM 
        = (aF + bFXi + eiF) - (aM + bMXi) 
        = [(aF-aM) + (bF-bM) Xi] + eiF 
        = Di + eiF, 
where Di is the part of the earnings difference due to differences in the coefficients 
between males and females, usually ascribed to labor market discrimination. Note that if 
“discrimination” is present, then D<0.  The second term, eiF , is the individual female’s 
deviation from expected female earnings.  Negative values indicate a woman earns less 
than would be expected, given her values of the characteristics X.  On average, D=diM, as 
in the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, since the expected value of eiF is zero.   
  The goal of this analysis is to determine the effect that this individual-specific 
gender-based differential, as measured by the deviation Di, has on the probability of 
making a transition from wage and salary sector employment to self-employment.  If 
females base expected wages only on the wages of other females, then D should have no 




woman will be more likely to leave wage employment, the lower (greater in absolute 
value) her value of D.  We also expect a similar effect of deviations from expected female 
earnings, as measured by eiF, consistent with the hypothesis put forth (for men) by 
Andersson and Wadensjo.   
  The methodology is straightforward.  First, standard log-linear wage equations are 
estimated separately for males and females: 
        Wi = a + bXi + ei. 
The variables used in the vector X include controls for several usual personal and job 
characteristics, including age, educational level, sector of employment, occupation, and 
health status (described below).
7  The samples are made up only of individuals in wage 
and salary employment in their current job in an initial period, t (either 1999 or 2000).
8 A 
two-step Heckman model controlling for selection into employment is used.
9   Using the 
cofficients from the log-wage equations, we calculate the female wage residuals, diF and 
diM, as the difference between the actual and predicted values of Wi, as described above.  
The difference between the two is the individual-specific discrimination measure, Di.   
  Given estimates of the residual and discrimination terms, the parameters are 
estimated for a specification for the conditional probability of making the transition to 
self-employment in period t+1 (year 2000 or 2001), given wage and salary employment in 
period the previous year, t:  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
    
6In the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, the usual measure is for the average within a sample.    
    
7Several specifications were examined, including those without the occupational controls and with a 
tenure variable.  The high prevalence of missing values for the tenure variable precluded its inclusion in the 
final analysis.  The qualitative results were the same as those presented in the paper. 
8 Many observations are repeated, since it is possible to be wage-employed in both periods.  The correlation 
across observations is controlled using the “cluster” option in STATA.   




  Prob[selft+1=1|selft=0] = f(Z, diF, Di). 
The probability of making the transition is assumed to be a function of a set of personal 
characteristics (Z), and the deviations from expected income (hereafter called RESIDF 
and DISCRIM).  Our hypotheses are that the coefficients on the latter two terms are 
negative.  We use a logit specification to estimate the parameters. 
  The analysis is conducted using data from the European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP).  A description of the data and on-line user’s manual are available at the 
Resource Center for Access to Data on Europe, http://www-rcade.dur.ac.uk/echp/.  See 
also the description found in Peracchi (2002).  The ECHP contains information for a 
sample of households and individuals first interviewed in 1994 and through 2001.  We 
use the data from the last three waves, for the 1999-2001 time period.  The complete 
ECHP survey includes households from 15 countries in Western Europe.  There were 
approximately 60,000 households sampled in 1995.  We focus on only four countries in 
this: France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany.
10   Our main samples were made up of 
individuals aged 18 and above in either 1999 or 2000.   
  The ECHP has several desirable properties: the initial sample was representative 
of the population in 1994, the data set is relatively large, its longitudinal nature allows for 
identification of changes in labor market sectors over time, and it includes many personal 
characteristics not found in other large samples (e.g., the national Labour Force Surveys). 
Most importantly, the survey was conducted utilizing a harmonized questionnaire, such 
that the same questions were asked in each of the countries, which is important for 




  The key variables of concern for this analysis are the definition of self-
employment status (versus wage and salary sector employment) and earnings.  The self-
employment variable is constructed from the “status in employment” variable from the 
person-level file, such that individuals who were classified as normally or currently 
working and who give self-employment as their main activity status are categorized as 
self-employed.  Because the question is aimed at the “main” job, self-employment in a 
secondary job is not captured here.  Both full- and part-time employed are included.   
  The earnings variable is measured as the annual wage and salary earnings.  There 
is no job-specific wage variable in the ECHP, nor a measure of annual hours or weeks 
worked.  We adjust for differences in hours worked with a weekly hours variable 
included in the wage regression.  Attempts to adjust the annual earnings variable for 
hours had no impact on the results.   
  The variables used in the analysis are defined in Table 1.  Some of these variables 
are used in both the wage equation and logit analyses.  The children variable (KIDS00) is 
used as the instrumental variable in the first stage of the analysis.  Most of the 
explanatory variables for the logistic regression, determinants of the probability of 
moving to self-employment, have been used by others in the literature.  Standard 
variables like age, marital status and educational level are expected to have positive 
effects on this transition, as found in both the cross-sectional and dynamic literature.  The 
home ownership variable, a proxy for wealth, is expected to have a positive effect as well. 
 The “other income” variable, which includes spousal income, is included under the 
hypothesis that increases in spousal income free a worker to engage in entrepreneurial 
                                                                                                                                                                                               




activity, as suggested by Devine (1994).
11  The hypothesized effects for both home 
ownership and other income are consistent with the liquidity-constraint story told by 
Evans and Jovanovic (1989).
12  The number of children in the household is included to 
examine the hypothesis that individuals desire self-employment for flexible hours and the 
ability to work at home.
13  Increases in the number of children are expected to increase 
the probability of self-employment.  Finally, the female residual and discrimination 
measures of interest in this study, RESIDF and DISCRIM, are expected to be inversely 
related to the transition to self-employment probability (since an underpayment and 
discrimination are indicated by negative values of these variables), as noted above.  We  
control for cross-national differences with country dummy variables. 
 
 
V.  RESULTS 
  Table 2 shows the average log-wages and the raw gender wage differentials for 
the sample period, separately by country.  In every country there is a substantial wage 
gap, consistent with the work of others.   
  Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 
3, for the pooled (all countries) sets of males and females who were employed in the first 
period.  After deletion of observations with missing values, the samples consisted of 
xx,xxx female and xx,xxx male workers.   
                                            
11 The dynamic approach taken here mitigates the problem of the endogeneity of asset accumulation and 
self-employment (Fairlie 1999). 
12 Evans and Jovanovic utilize a “wealth” measure in their analysis. 




  The results of the log-earnings regression estimation for both males and females 
are presented in the Appendix Table A1.  The results are consistent with other work 
regarding earnings determination.  The human capital, firm, and other personal 
characteristics variables all perform as expected, and the models are highly significant.  
The mean values of RESIDF and DISCRM, calculated from the predicted wages based on 
these log-earnings regressions, are presented in Table 3.  The mean value of RESIDF is 
zero, as expected, while the mean value for DISCRIM is about -.30, the negative sign 
indicating that differences in returns to characteristics cause the earnings of females in 
this sample to be lower on average than those of comparable males.  
  The results from the transition probability analysis are presented in Table 4, for 
three different specifications of the logit equation.  In column (1) we present the 
coefficient estimates (and standard errors) for a specification which includes, in addition 
to a set of control variables, only the residual from the female wage equation, RESIDF.   
The significant negative coefficient indicates that women who earned less than expected 
in the first period (compared to other women) had an increased likelihood of moving to 
self-employment, ceteris paribus.  This finding is consistent with a model of sector choice 
based upon expected earnings, and is consistent with the results for men in Andersson 
and Wadensjo (2006).  Column (2) presents the coefficients when only DISCRIM is 
included with the control variables.  The negative coefficient on that variable indicates 
that women who earned less than expected in the first period (when compared to men) 
also had an increased likelihood of making the wage and salary sector to self-employment 
transition.  The coefficient is not statistically significant from zero, however.  Column (3) 




model yields the highest chi-square and r-square values.  The coefficient estimates and 
standard errors indicate that, like in the first two equations, the direction of the effects are 
consistent with the hypotheses, but only the effect of RESIDF is statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  This may be due to the small number of observations making a 
transition (less than 1 percent).  The evidence regarding the question of whether labor 
market discrimination in the wage and salary sector contributes to female self-
employment is, therefore, mixed.   
  The goodness-of-fit statistics indicate the models perform well.  The chi-square 
statistics indicate overall significance at the .0001 level.  Despite the performance of the 
model, only a few of the other explanatory variables have statistically significant impacts 
on the sectoral transition probability.  The move from wage to self-employment is found 
to be more likely among women who have children and who have higher levels of other 
household income.  Both of these findings are consistent with other work.  There do not 
appear to be any statistically significant differences in transition rates across the countries. 
    We should note that the analysis does not capture other transitions that 
could be made more likely as a result of wage discrimination.  Women who perceive they 
are underpaid relative to men may move to another firm, or to unemployment or non-
participation.  Our analysis therefore understates the total effect that such discrimination 
might have. 
  In order to partially gauge the importance of this effect, we estimated the same 





14  The results are presented in Table 5.  Because this includes workers 
making other transitions, the sample size is larger than in the previous table.  The results 
are similar to those in Table 4, in the sense that the RESIDF and DISCRIM variables 
have similar effects.  One difference is that  the coefficients for the DISCRIM variable are 
significantly different from zero in specifications (2) and (3), perhaps in part due to the 
more precise estimates which result from the significantly larger number of people exiting 
employment for one of the three other states.  The magnitude of the DISCRIM coefficient 
is much larger in this specification, however, indicating that discrimination may indeed 
have a pronounced effect on these other transitions (to unemployment and inactivity).  
Again the models perform well as indicated by the chi-square statistic, and in this case  
more of the control variables are found to have statistically significant effects and there is 
a higher pseudo R-squared.  In particular, educational level and marital status are now 
found to affect the probability of exiting employment.  Regarding these other explanatory 
variables, however, it should be noted that their interpretations may be different, as they 
now refer to the effect on the probability of any exit from employment as opposed to the 
probability of entering self-employment from employment.  In addition, it is now found 
that female workers in France are significantly more likely to exit employment than are 
females in the other countries. 
  The specifications in Tables 4 and 5 all assume that the effect of the RESIDF and 
DISCRIM variables are the same in the four countries.  We relaxed this assumption in 
another specification of the overall exit rate in which we allowed interaction terms 
between these variables and the country dummy variables.  The results (available upon 
                                            




request) showed significant interactions with RESIDF for all of the countries (relative to 
Germany as the excluded group), with lesser impacts of the female residual in France and 
Belgium and greater impacts in Luxembourg.  The interactions with the discrimination 
variable were significant only for Luxembourg, again with a greater impact on the exit 
rate. 
 
V.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
  Self-employment is an important alternative for employed women, and has been 
encouraged in some countries in order to increase female activity rates and incomes.  This 
paper examines the hypothesis that gender based wage discrimination in the wage and 
salary sector is one factor that increases the attractiveness of the self-employment option. 
 Using data for a sample of workers in four countries in Europe, we estimate the impact 
that measured wage discrimination in one year has on the probability a woman chooses 
self-employment in the following year.  The analysis yields mixed results, suggesting that 
discrimination does not significantly impact the self-employment decision, but it does 
affect the overall exit rate from employment.  The results consistently support the 
hypothesis of Andersson and Wadensjo (2006), however, indicating that women who are 
“underpaid” relative to other women are more likely to leave wage-employment for self-
employment.     
  The analysis here is considered a first step, with several topics for further research 
to be addressed.  For example, the paper ignores the issue of self-selection into wage and 




solution is to estimate a Heckman two-step selection model, with multiple selection in the 
first step.  A second issue has to do with the simple measure of discrimination used in this 
paper.  Many alternative measures have been proposed in the literature over the past four 
decades.
15  While it is possible that the results are sensitive to the measure used, we doubt 
this is a serious concern, however.  A third extension would be to conduct a multinomial 
analysis of the exits from employment, allowing separate effects for transitions to self-
employment, unemployment and non-activity.  Finally, we can expand the analysis to 
include additional years and countries, which might help address the problem of small 
numbers of transitions.  
  An important question not addressed in this paper is the likelihood of success in 
self-employment for those who make the transition.  Andersson and Wadensjo (1996) 
find that men who leave wage employment because they are underpaid tend to have less 
success in self-employment as well.  Further research might address this question for 
women, with the extension of including a wage and salary sector discrimination measure 
as an explanatory variable.  We could therefore address the question of whether women 
who suffered wage and salary sector discrimination are any more or less likely to succeed 
when self-employed than other women.  If they are less likely to succeed, then again the 
question is raised of whether self-employment is an optimal outcome for these women.  
One concern in studying self-employment success, however, is whether the data regarding 
earnings are reliable, as previously noted.   
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  TABLE 1 
 
  DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
VARIABLE  DEFINITION                                                                 
 
RESIDF  Residual from female log-earnings equation. 
 
DISCRIM  Measure of gender wage differential (equation in text) 
 
LWG    Natural log of annual earnings in period 0 
 
MSP00   1 if married with spouse present; 0 otherwise. 
 
ED300   1 if third level education; 0 otherwise 
ED200   1 if secondary level of education; 0 otherwise 
 
AGE00   Age (in years) at interview date 
AGESQ  AGE squared 
 
PUB00   1 if employed in public sector; 0 otherwise. 
 
FSIZE600  1 if employed at firm with 100-499 employees; 0 otherwise 
FSIZE700  1 if employed at firm with 500 or more employees; 0 otherwise 
 
HRS00   Usual hours worked per week in main job 
 
BADHLTH  1 if respondent indicates general health is poor or bad; 0 otherwise. 
HLTHHAM  1 if respondent has health limitation that hampers ability to work 
 
KIDS00  Number of children in household 
 
OTHINC00  Total household earnings less respondent’s earnings/1000 
OWN00  1 if respondent owns home; 0 otherwise 
 
LUX00   1 if resides in Luxembourg; 0 otherwise 
 
BEL00   1 if resides in Belgium; 0 otherwise. 
 
FRA00   1 if resides in France; 0 otherwise. 
 
GER00   1 if resides in Germany; 0 otherwise (excluded group) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Note: the analysis also includes dummy variables indicating employment in the agricultural or 
industrial sectors of the economy, as well as occupational dummy variables for professional, 
managerial, technical, clerk, and other occupations. 
    







Average Male and Female Annual Earnings 
Wage and Salary Workers 
1999-2000 
 
  Belgium  France  Germany  Luxembourg 
Male log-
earnings 
9.580  9.543  9.567  10.139 
Female log-
earnings 
9.120  9.137  9.011  9.523 
Gender 
Differential 
.460  .406  .556  .616 
 








VARIABLES USED IN WAGE AND TRANSITION EQUATIONS 
Workers in Wage and Salary Sector Employment  
 
                               FEMALES    MALES 
VARIABLE    MEAN          ST. DEV.              MEAN   ST.DEV      
LWG           9.139    .985       9.667       .906    
AGE00       37.607         11.051          38.603         11.479          
AGESQ    1536.423       868.094        1621.953       927.311         
ED300  .281      .450             .272      .445           
ED200    .405        .491            .408       .491           
MSP00       .566      .496            .613      .487           
PUB00        .266      .442            .205      .403  
HRS00       29.416         15.970          38.096         14.811 
FSIZ6       .097      .296            .144      .351 
FSIZ7       .027      .161           .048      .214           
BADHLTH00   .053        .224            .043        .203           
HLTHHAM00  .025      .156           .023      .151           
LUX00       .133      .339            .176      .381           
BEL00       .162      .368           .153      .360           
FRA00       .315         .465    .277        .447           
KIDS00       .699      .919            .779           1.017 
OTHINC00  376.213           675.355          301.329            553.586 
RESIDF         -0.000    .663    ---              --- 
DISCRIM      -0.294              .706    ---    --- 
                   
Sample Size    21261        25039 
                                                                                                                  
 
Note: means and standard deviations for the “sector” and “occupation” dummy 
variables are available on request.   





  TABLE 4 
 
  LOGIT PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
Female Transitions from Employment to Self-Employment 
     
    Coefficient  
    (St. Error) 
 
            Specification 
 
VARIABLE    (1)      (2)      (3)   
INTERCEPT  -6.166  -5.150  -5.987 
  (1.720)  (1.804)  (1.967) 
RESIDF  -1.040  -    -1.032 
    (.2422)      -    (.2550) 
DISCRIM     -    -.6923  -.4234 
    -    (1.921)  (1.582) 
AGE00  -.0019  - .0495  - .0142 
    (.0945)  (.1070)  (.1100) 
AGESQ  .0002  .0007  .0003 
    (.0012)  (.0013)  (.0014) 
ED300   -.1283  -.0487  -.0886 
    (.4127)  (.4555)  (.4436) 
ED200   - .2500  -.1557  -.2383 
    (.3940)  (.4036)  (.3992) 
KIDS00  .4665  .4379  .4521 
    (.1404)  (.1568)  (.1637) 
MSP00  -.4088  -.5915  -.5281 
    (.3193)  (.6380)  (.5684) 
OTHINC00  .0005  .0005  .0005 
    (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001) 
OWN00   .1845    .1940  .1845 
    (.3166)  (.3132)  (.3170) 
LUX00  -.7927  -.9465  -.7925 
    (.4965)  (.4955)  (.4976) 
BEL00   -0.6200  -0.4450  -0.5808 
    (.4772)  (.4611)  (.4846) 
FRA00   -.4963  -0.4202  -0.4282 
    (.4257)  (.5335)  (.5505) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Sample Size  16350  16350  16350 
-2Dlog L  82.80  85.07  86.37 
Pseudo R-square  .1032  .0405  .1034 
______________________________________________________________________ 







  LOGIT PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
Female Transitions from Employment 
 
    Coefficient  
    (St. Error) 
 
            Specification 
 
VARIABLE    (1)      (2)      (3)   
INTERCEPT  2.721  3.908  3.483 
  (.3842)  (.3840)  (.4089) 
RESIDF  -1.257  -    -1.248 
    (.0643)      -    (.0656) 
DISCRIM     -    -2.325  -2.056 
    -    (.2334)  (.2659) 
AGE00  -.3307  -.3978  - .3867 
    (.0231)  (.0234)  (.0252) 
AGESQ  .0043  .0050  .0049 
    (.0003)  (.0003)  (.0003) 
ED300   -.4185  -.2019  -.2333 
    (.0942)  (.0927)  (.0972) 
ED200   - .0253   .1025  .0717 
    (.0816)  (.0781)  (.0829) 
KIDS00  .1507  .1209  .0782 
    (.0422)  (.0422)  (.0444) 
MSP00  .2056  -.4259  -.3571 
    (.0793)  (.1052)  (.1097) 
OTHINC00  0.0002  .0002  .0002 
    (.0000)  (.0000)  (.0000) 
OWN00   -.2935  -.2958  -.2806 
    (.0710)  (.0686)  (.0714) 
LUX00  -0.1132  -0.1577  -0.0790 
    (.1316)  (.1300)  (.1324) 
BEL00   0.0274   0.0932   0.2149 
    (.1363)  (.1283)  (.1433) 
FRA00    0.7336   1.008   1.086 
    (.0856)  (.0953)  (.0998) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Sample Size  17469  17469  17469 
-2Dlog L  759.43  456.43  764.18 
Pseudo R-square  .1382  .0682  .1469 
______________________________________________________________________ 







  LOG -EARNINGS REGRESSION PARAMETERS 
  Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
_______________________________________________________________  
                FEMALES                                                  MALES 
VARIABLE  Coeff.  St. Err.  Coeff..             St. Err.      
Intercept             5.580564     .0763722      5.550477     .0848529     
age00 |     .1010448    .0041252      .1360311     .0045812     
agesq |    -.0011129   .000052   -.00153     .0000581    
ed300 |     .3427608     .0185962      .2867683     .0159153     
ed200 |     .1664185     .0147001  .1216699     .0121177     
msp00 |      -.07955     .0120853      .1586553     .0118804     
pub00 |     .1774585     .0122131      .1613031     .0119414     
hrs00 |     .0317087     .0005871      .0211623     .0005718     
ag00 |     -.2667356     .074236  -.243517     .0504709     
ind00 |     .1051471     .0162077       .1053901     .0110533      
prof00 |     .2033963     .0482936       .3432661     .0240637     
mang00 |     .3263199     .0236493      .2645078      .020314     
man200 |     .2112577     .0180904  .1796667     .0133874     
clerk00 |     .1654945     .0162766      .1132368      .015226      
othocc00 |    -.0734255     .0191659      -.104364     .0209942     
fsiz6 |      .1580391      .014615      .1647125     .0111768     
fsiz7 |     .1232898     .0236992       .1595637      .015424     
badhlth00 |    -.0550605     .0261711      -.0744684      .023921     
hlthham00 |    -.1200748     .0414654      -.2358736     .0370755     
lux00 |     .5660283     .0187091      .5555524     .0144081     
bel00 |     .1201221     .0213164       -.0006247     .0198834     
fra00 |     .2345255     .0146483      .1071417     .0138474      
   
Mills      .1022354             .0114862  .037218     .0121785 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Sample Size   44013                                                                  39563 
Chi-Sqaured   12412.71                                                            12529.61               
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Bold indicates significantly different from zero at .01 level of 
confidence better. 
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